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~o be delivered by 'ike nnn.~field, M.C. before the Acnde~ of Political
Science, Hotel Astor, New York Cit,y, Nove~ber 12, 1947.

Ti E CHINESE POLICY OF THE UJfl'l'FD STATES

isunder tanding of our policy in Chine. nrioes le.rgelT !roc n failure
to underst.und the nature of Americnn foreign

oliq

i~elt.

Therefore,

I think it eaoential, at the outrset, to consider briefiy tho aubstance of'

tbat policT in terms of three co!2ponents: objective, pattern and technique.
Without

cle r comprehension of these distinctions

nr~ their respective

cho.raoteristics, 1 t is difficult to grnap the implicntiona of our Cbintl
policy or to relate thnt policy to our actiYiV in other psu·ts of the

world.
Let us bear in .Und that the objective of A::lerican foreign policy is
indivisible

nd constant.

Our goTernment seeks the same ultimate ends

whether ito policy ie t'perating in Europe, in
in the United Nations.

outh America , in Asia, or

l'urtbel'llOre, the objective has re:!Wined unchanged

since the dawn ot the Republic. It ie, in the wordu

or the lBte President

Franklin D. Roosnelt, "to defend the honor, tho frcedoo, the rl&}lts, the
interests

nd the well-being of the American people•.

An essential corrollary

to our objeati•e, however, is thnt - ngain in the worde of Mr. Roosevelt "We aeoY. no gain at the expense ot others, 'We threaten no one, nor do we
tolerate tbree.te from others.•
In contr st with the fixit1 and tho uniTersblit.r of the objective, the
pattern of American policy, which finds its mo8t Tind expression in our

gre t State pnpers, is grndually evolving.

It is the broad blueprint tor

ction which represents the accumulated wisdom of countless American

~inda.

It is the product of the interests, the hopes, e.nd even the fears, ot
our whole people.

-2-

ttern of poliCY' 18 oY1 l71lh re in evidence.

fhe &ow evolution of the
In

tea a Hui.apherie ollde.rlfir

Un

tiona of the
t1on to

Dl"'8

Doctrine.

ller foUDda-

t'ro2 th

In Europe •

-.o• 1"ro!J a concept o! 18ola-

4 p concern in the political and econoldc fortunes of th&t
And 1n Asia, too, there 1

oonUnent.

d

the

l

nux

of Ute

'ttern

in the interest of the obJecttYe.

!be Tnird COilponent or policy •• use within tne

~ttern

t.ech~u.

- conoerne the 1.nstru11enta

to achine the objeett·n. It coDSiata of all

the eaeurea - dipl0110.tio1 politicel, cUltural nnd econom1o - t

employed in aMtiog the ui.genoiu ot inter,n ational relations.

t are

In the laet

anal7aia 1 it includu, too, mUitar;y measure - whether force, threat of

:force, or the aaqu11J1t1on ot atrategic beMa.
pattern, the te

In contnat to the fixed

obJect1Ye and tbe

e~lYing

r

ncS responai.Te to ch nging conditions.

in flexible,

n1Clue of foreign policy

ust

AI.rr other course,

ln a 0011plex and unstable world, trould be ._n in'f1tat1on to dlsast.er
lith these

thrM

cUatillotions - object1Te 1 ps.tte.m,

n4 technique -

iD alnd let ua examine the hbtorical. d..,.elopment of the Cbinese policy of

tbe On.lted Btatea.

'the objecti•• of our policy in Cbina does not 41fter

from the oTerul objective

ot American pol1c7.

e are conoorn.ed o.o IIIUCh

w1 t.b llt.he honor, the f'reedom~ the rights ond interests and tbe well-being

ot the .Aurican people• in our relatione

with Chi

as we ere in our

rel t1one nth BriWn, with France, or with BuJsia.
HoweTer,

a our interests hen bro dened nd our world reaponslbUities

haye 1noreaaed1 the pattern ot Chineae policy h
tion.

Cbina

undergone

Durilll the early period of our relationships witb tho

a

tUl too rnote, too unlmcnm

thiakJ.n& Of the Alaeriean people.

al01r evolunehu

plre,

f: ctor, to loo11 largelJ in the

fbe initlal pattern Of goTel'JDent policy

-3ren ctn 1 .rgely concern tor our shipping lntereato and the sn!ety of

our mistlionarios.

e wanted

11

equal CO!I.£1ercial opportunity• with European

Jben the British opened Chinese port6 to their

arch nts for our traders.

citizens, ours aleo gained entrance .
terr1torlal1ty, we did the

sa~:~e.

And when they established erlra-

In this enrl.7 period •• avoided anne:u.-

tion ot alien territory, resorting

rimari~

to a technique or c!iplomact

to secure our objecti?e.

B1 the turn or tbe centur,r1 howeTer, there were indications that
·~unl

eouercial opportunity" was inadeq_W!J.te in the tace ot mounting 1m-

perlaliat1o pres:.ul."es on China.

It wns ut thio point that John Hay

circulated hie now femoWI •Open •Door• notes among the Great Powers .

And

when 1 t became evident tbe.t eYen this step was unlikel;r to ste:n tbe preda-

tol'T t.endenciee or other powers, especially Japan e.nd Ruea1c., we expanded

•The Open Door• to embrace the principle of mainta1n1nc the •independence
and integrlt;r of China.•

But we soon discovered thct diplomacy could

operate aa a technique for fulfilling tbis pattern only it there axisted

a balance ot power in the fl:lr Enst.
World lfnr.

'l'hia

~lance

FrOlll that conflict, Japan emerceci

w s upset by the First

s the domiMnt force in

Eastern Asia.
Nevertheless, nt the Wasbin,ton Conference of 1922, an ftttempt •ne
de to mninte.in the •Open Door• and China's •independence end territorial

integrity" through noru.l. diplomatic methods.

e oscrificed

part of our

m111tar.r potential in the Pacific, in return !or Jepan1 B pledges to fore1o
further expansion.

Under the pressure of 1 ts mi11te.17 leaders, Japan in

1931 turned rrom the woys of peace.

-J.lor tully another decade, howeTer, we sought to preserve the pattern

ot the •Open Door• and of Cbins 1 e •t.erritorio.l. integrity• without resort
to military techniques. le wrote notes. le engaced in aonTeraations. le
apob anp-il.T.

But the J apane1e m111 tary

We spoke softq.

onward into Mongolia, North Chiua,

Br

chine rolled

nd the Iangtse w.lley and South China.

19401 with Japanese armies et.raddUng tbe coastline or East Asia

troll Ioree. and Manohuria to Indo-China - and epenrheaded deepl.J into t.he
body

ot the continent - and with Europa eet aflame

by Uermon:r, it had

ceased to be a question of maintaining the pattern of our policy.

The

Allerioan people ware !need w1 tb tbe ine.xornble re 11ty ot a free America

poaDibl:y etand1111 alone in a hostile, totalitarian world.
American J)lblic opinion began to ehitt rapidly.
technique or policy.

So, too, did our

fo the exhausted diplomatic aeaaurea we had taken

t.piu.t Japan, •• -.dded ecoDOIIic aeaaurea in the fom
restr1ct1ona on trade with Japan.

ot id to Ch1na and

We extend*' LendtLeaee to the hard-

pressed Chineae and wi tb the •nying 'l'ipra•, epread on ainoTer oTer their
detenaeleea cities.

l'iDB.lly we reached that point in the tide ot hiato17

when a reauertion ot the pattern ot our policy in China and the i ar East,
coupled w1 th our ectiT1ties eluewhe.re 1n the world, ottered the last hope
of c!etandina beyond our ehoree •the honor, the freedoa, the rights, the
intere~ta,

and the well-being

or

the American people".

!he eo~~plexitiea or the war iDTolTed the United States in the affairs

ot China to an unprecedented degree. iooooaio end millte.ry probleu ot
the joint struggle agn1119t Jape.n forced our GoTerment to t.Ue an inorn.sing conoern in the internal problems

noraall)" haTe avoided.

ot

China& - a course which •• would

!he United States dealt of'fioiall.y only w1 tb the

- sstional Qovern:llent of Chi&nei Kai-sbek to which, theoretically at aDJ" rate,
th

Vital considerations connected with the

Chinese Co!!lmunistzs adhered.

war, hoJrever,

de it es9ential for us to try to forestall n

in

r~ture

even the theoretical unity or Chinese reei atanae - a rMpture which conceivnbly could have lengthened the war.
thil approech.

It

Wl\S

!'here is nothing conteetable in

eaaentinlly the name technique thJ.lt n.a employed in

It was predice.ted on a recognition o!

France, in Italy, end in Poland.

the bard real!t1 of the cost ot the war in termt ot American livee and
resources.
While altina China internall1

to Jlllintdn ita

.

unity and to re:nain in

the field ngainat Japan, we were ••ek1Di also to build up China'• international position in order to prep:t.re the Chinese for a poedble expe.neion
of their role in the postwnr 1rorld.

First of all, we l!eoo¢aed China as

one of the Big Four of tbe war G.gninst the !xie.

extra-terri torial.1 tJ and wiped out the stigmn
the Cairo Conference, in December,

~943,

In 194J we abandoned

or Chinese

exclusion.

•e endorsed the principle

return of all Chinese territory seised by Japan.

At

or

the

Still later we accepted

China as one ot the Five Greet Powers in the United Nation11 .

Throughout

the wnr our seeistanee went excluaiYely to the Central Government and ••
interter.d as 11 t.tle as circumst&noes would parmi t in internnl Chinese
affairs.

In line with the

t~ditional.

p.'lttern of .Al:!erican policy, ••

desired an independent China at the end of hostilities, :aot e.n ad1ainistrative and

ilitary appendage of the United States.

But poece found ua, notwithetending our de8ire to the contnry, deeply
enmeshed in Cbineee affairs .
immediately with the !iring

It

or

11US

impoesible to extricate ourselves

the last •hot.

e faced a draotically altered

-6oitun.tion in the For &at.
a bUJh vacuua.

The sll.stt.ering of the Jopnnese

Into 1 t had rushed new power

fro~

p1re hnd left

oviet As ia, through

onchuria to Datren and Port Arthur, and onr the border into 'ores to the
tb1rty-it1Chth parallel.

On the other hand, Aaerican Forces occupied Japan,

the R7ukJUa, and Southern (orea.

Between these new frontiers of power la7

the aeething uncertainty of China; o. China on the Terge of economic collA!pae

and alreaq in the first throes of

renew~

cinl

r.

In tbia chaotio lituation, the need for redefiDinc the pattern.or our
Chinese polioy became iaperatiTe.

It •aa forthcoming in Preoident Truman's

policy etatement or DecHber 16, 19.45.

Linking the Chinese a1 tUiltion to

our faith in the future of the United Hations, the President declared that,

"it is the !ira belief ot this GoTeri'Jilent that a strong, un1ted e.nd doooratio ChiM is of the utaost illportanoe to the aucceaa of this United
Let us consider, tor a ao•ent,

N tions Organisation and tor world peace.•

the 1mplio tiona or

t..~il

eta.tement.

objectiTO or our toreign policy?

1& 1 t in accord wi tb the fundamental

It ia.

the derenae or tho , woll-being

or the A:nerioan people ia inextric.'lblT bound up with the queation of the
maintenance ot peace.

Pe~oe,

1n turn, will bo influenced profoundly

the interns tional position and tho internal condi tiona or China.

by

Is 1 t a

natural extension ot the historical pattern ot our policy in China?

It ie.

We ha•• co11e a long 11'8.3' !rom the •equal collllercial opportunity" through

.

the •open Door• and the •saintenance of China • s independence an4 terri-

torial 1ntegr1t,-•, to the present •otrong, unit.ecS and de::lOcratio ~ina• .
But this logical and 1M'fit&ble ••olution bas developed through the interrelation ot our expended interests, our world position, end our power
and the great political changes B the world ho.a undergone.

- 7The Prenident1 s December 16th atntement contains two factors that
warrant careful examination.

There is, firot of all, the frank acknowledge-

ent o1' our obligations to the Hatioool Government of Chit •

And secondly,

there is the Whole body of 11easures ond methode with which we hope to
re lise the pattern of our present policy.

It was e.bsolutely essential to

aid the Central GoTerrment in the transportation

or

its troops to die&.l"'a

and to e'f'aauate the Jepanese1 1f tor no other reason than that we h3d
coiDIId tted ouroelTes to do so.

We extended this help in api te or strong

counter-pressures at ho!lle end in the face
Chinese Communists.

ot Tiolent opposition

!'ro~

the

We extended it even at the eo&t o! American lives.

We would h.e\'e preferred to help c.n 1nternslly-unif1ed China.
absence of un1 tq we aided the Centrnl GoTernment

llut in the

exclusiTe~-the

Govern-

ment we had dea.lt with throughout the •arJ the Qoyernment we recognized e11

the legal authorit7 of the Chinese nation.

Let us no oomaider the aethodG end

Ht.S\tren through

which we hope to

see retU.ized the pattern of •a strong, united nnd democrntic Chin .•

I

must stress th..'lt these 111ensures and 1:1ethoda conc.rn the technJ.gue o! foreign
policy and, COruleqUentq, there is
& ther, •i thin the 11111 ts or our

JlO

oral nd ethicnl concepts, these measures

nnd methode l'llllfJt remain flexible ond

lems.

virtue eer.!.!. in their Oone1stency.

dapta.ble, to meet ever-changing prob-

I emphasise thb because those who delight in pointing out t.be inoon-

sistenciee of our foreign policy uswlly are thinking in ter:ns of 1 te techniQue.
Paruount among our methode in China is continued recognition of the
N t1otlal. Government nnd cooperation, internationally, with that Government.
One need not haTe access to secret Stc.te

De~rtll'lent

docusenta to recognise

- 8that thil procedure is &ill being followed.
our support of China 1 B

In the interM tional tiel<!,

a tionsl Government hae been i.llpoaingly etea dy.

We haTe backed I antina otficiilly on the reparations issue in llanchuria,
aDd 'We haTe sought by diplomatic pressure to

e.B

iat in the restoration

of Chinese e.dllinietration to Dairen and Port Arthur.

Still another evi-

dence of our support for the 1int1onal GoTermaent wae given by Secretary
.ila.rshall s.t lloeoow in the sprina ot 1947.

He refused to permit the dis-

cussion of the China Queetion without the consent ot the Chinese.

The

effectiveness of this aeaeure wca attested to b.Y the approving demonstrations which greeted 1 t in Hanldng, Pe1pinc e.nd Shancha1.
Our teohrd.que Y1 tb regard to the internal e1 tuntion in China i& also

clearly iDdioated in President 'l'ruun• • statement.
reapoll8ib1li ty for the eet&bliah21ent

ot peace and

Be b&s pbced pri-oa.ry
un1 ty on the Chinese

tbnselTes, and asserted that we will DOt intenene to influence the
course

ot

an;r ciTU strife.

At the anme time be has pointed out that our

interest in the peace ot the world glTel us a ooncom1te.nt iDtereat in a
peaceful China..

IJ.'herefore, be suggested thAt the Chinese tske certain steps

to promote internal etability. Among these were the ceaaation ot hostilities, the oonTening ot

6

national political conference to solTe the proble.

ot internal unitJ' throup a IIOdiflcation of the o06-party diotatorahip,
end finally the integrating of all Chinese amed forces into a national
aray.

'fo help bring o.bout theee ohangee, the Preeident

llarahall to China.

d1~5patohed

General

FUrther, he held out to a unified China the o!fer of

reeaonable aid in ecoDO:Jic rehabilits.t1on and eeaietence in the rflconatruction ot its llilitarT organisation.

-9w.:te

At !irat, 1 t ce

G thi.G tecbniquel

dolioste eettlement cov ring all th

succese.

to tbcr with infinite care.

s put

picions of twenty or more

arilJ".

yer.r•'

kabl

tribute to tb

ar

Th

Bhe.ttering ot that

gr~t

departu

pert.inncity

s.aa

us-

tr

at tempor-

nd wi&dOl:l of General Marshall.

hope, ao you will remember, came in the
Genorcl nrtJhsll had

troll Chinn tbe Cowuniets Yere

i thin

ccudng th

week or hie

ntion!l.liots ot fall-

to relinauisl one-party control ot the Go\"erment. And the tlati.onal-

isto were chargi.ll£ the Ccr....zunlota with attempting to
in

uniqo

t'hat it b d over become a hope

to America to report to Preddent Truman.

r turned

s of

dur tion ore r conoUed at 1

spring ot 1946 - nt the very ll'Oment or trultion.

ing

jor probl

Bitternaoses nd

ucc•e w o DeTor a · certc.inty.

•

ed on the werge of

~et

up

puppet regi e

nchuria.
ct~

it

tters Uttle

IU)W

who tired the firet Chot.

Genere.1

rohall lntilr bl.nmed the «rl're:Diats of both pnrtiea for the f il.ure of
di tion.

What is oignificant 1& thnt the

oet detemined efforts of one

of our blest orlioiala hsd been 1noutf1c1ent. to halt tbe renenl of

otrife.

In effeot, tbe breakdown of peace condemned the Chinese people

to an indefinite continuation

or the

~1ner1e

of the

~oua

eight years .

1'h

vision ot pe oe, which had finred oo brightl,y in tlle spring of 1946,

41

od s

dUy during the late a

of oppoolng forcea ga~e

•

battles.

d littl

er nd utumn.

7 to ak1rrdohe5.

Occacional contacts

Skina1ehe grew into pitched

Chinese again ld.llod Chine e, ant1 ill ev r-iner

to show for our efforts exo pt mount1

ectionB of tbe ChineDe people.

trnted hopeo on the peeoe-l!akers.

eing

DU1!1bel'8.

hostility from large

fb8'y vented the bitternes11 of their :trus-

e

- 10Al.moot

year to the dny ntter hle first pronounc nent on hina policy,

President Trwnn acknowledged the t'nilure of our efforts to quell the oiVil
On Deceaber 18, 1946, he iosuet!

Will".

While the ba.oio

second etot.e:nent indi~ting tha t

ttern of our policy still re:r.ained, eo e of the instru-

mentalities with which we aought to operate .-auld hll.,e to be held in abcy nee.
Since the ret\U"'l or General llarehall, e.nc! followin« the r pid

n

thdrow 1

ot

American •illtary forces during the early months of this year, there ho.e been
no a1gn1ficant change in our methods of dealing with the Chinese situation.
f•e still aotiTely support the eoTereignty of China. and the covernment of
ChiaJll Kai-shek.
in& to

A definite proposal of ecoDOlllic aid

t.3oo,ooo,ooo,

ia now under consideration.

however, the.t Chinn doea not ~t the preoent tille -

~

assistance, emount-

We aust. keep in mind,
in the worde o! oeoretary

Marshall -- •possess the bas1a for rehabilitction that Western Europe does.•
Civil War now rages throughout North Chim and Kancburia.
a state or incipient oeparatism.

Other areas ere 1n

The Comaunista are resorting to their old

extremist tactics ot brutal terrorisa.
Tba.t. we regret this situation, tho.t we Sfatpathize with the Chinese
people goes w1 thout uying.
we

c~n

But 1 t is equally true tba t there ia little

do, as our experience haa shown, to alleTiate

~~eir

difficulties.

NeTerthelen, powerful and cap&ble voices are heard in tbe United States
urging us imaedintely to project ourselTes into the middle of tbb problem of
Cb1Dn.

Let us , for a moment, consider the news of those who object. to the

o.bayant state of our policy in China.
affection tor the Chinese.

Mal\Y' Americana have a deep and einoere

Amons them there are those wlto point out that

it is ienoble of ue to forsake our wartime clUes in their hour of need .
Therefore, thet insist, let us do eo ething for China,

nd let us 'do it

through the living 15111bol of China' 1 reeiotenoe, Chiang lai-shek.

..

-11Let

e, firnt ot all, make clear the extant of aid elready made avail-

able to th

tional Go.-ernment.

I

~v

allude"' to the postwar aill ta.ry

and international aesist.anoe wbleb we he.Te tendered to Preei4ent Cbi&ng.

ention ehould alao be aade of the Aaerican Army and tlaVT alaaions still
in Chinn to help establish a trul.)r national llili'Uu7 organisation.

191.1 total aid in the form of loans and grants is in the
tlro and a hDlf billion dollars .

Since

neighbo~bood

or

In cddltion we have transferred extensive

quanti ties of. surplus property at

M

aloo turned over 271 NaYnl vessels.

traotion

ot original coat. f!"e ha:n

Thie year the United utates foreign

Relief Prograa will allot $27.7 million in medical

suppli~s

end food to

ChinA.
Furtbenaore, the United States atsnda couitted to provide ad itlonal

sn1atance tor non-oivll

war purposes

t ere 1e BOll& nanuranoa th.et our

na the aircumst4noea

When

id will assist in the restoration of the

well-baing of the Chinese people, ita flow should increase.
dncere~

p~it.

Those -.ho

cUat.resaed oYer tbe plight ot Chinn, need bATe no fear.

re

'Ibe

Onited St teo Qoye.rnaent •ill do ull in 1 ts power to 181sen the sufferiugs

or the Chineae people, but will resist firmly ell 111-considerea etforta to
haTe it add to tbeir distress.
Yaeuel:T, that ••

•ao

The gre t ehortcoaing ot

who 1nsiat,

something• for ChiM io that they taU to rea.lice tbe

llll1tat.1ona aa to Whnt •• can do.
symp thetio trieods.

ma~

e can otand betide the Chineee

U!

We ean help tbelll through our printe ehariUes, our

Christian Dieoions, our educational

nd cultural endonents, and throuch

goverD!Iental grouts or loalll!l to aeet. their 110st pressin& needa.

Deusures we haTe tnken nnd will continue to tote.

All these

But we cannot suppl7

the op1r1 tual a park which wUl release the cnpeci ties of the Chinese people

-12and ehannel the:a into e reconatruotion of their noble civilia tion.

'J'h t

spark can - aDd will 801leda.T - come only tro. the heart ot Chine. 1 tselt.
Before concluding, I uhould like to diseuse briefly another line or
thought in opposition to the present
I u

relat1~e

a'bey nee of our Chin ee policy.

tully aware that there is a growing e.dvocacy in the Onited Staten for

action to halt the spread of ColZilll'Wl1u 1n Ohinn..

eneral :fUDdamentsl asauaptiowu

Briefl7, it conoists of

the. t we oatmot perait a01' foreign power

to dominate China; thc.t 1t ie futile to halt

COIDIINnio in Greece

nd not

to halt it in Ch1DBJ that unless dd1 both economic e.nd m1l1t.ary, is extended i•ediately, the Central Govermsent

ot China will coll pee; and

finall7 that such aid will be much cheaper than grandiose areh&ll Plana
for

Europe.

Ono or the most disturbing !actors in th"e views of those wbo

inebt on poe1tiYe aotion is their IUUltaption tbat the Un1 ted

S~!ltes

GoYernaent ie unaware that China and P.us1io. have a common border of several
tboueand .tles.

I wish to reassure these people.

only aware of the existence or this
in terms or the W.tiaate
half a centuryl

objeoti~•

bo~

The GoYe:rmaent is not

but haa been considering it

of Ameri«ln foreign policy for more than

Let us, then, at leant concede a measure of Ynlidity to

the decisions which grow out or thh experience and the day-to-da1 reports
of trained ob8e.wers in the field.
I shall a wid a detailed discussion of the problems, both mill taey
and econoaic, wtticb would be involved in positive action in Chim.
to 8117, despite specious argutlente

aoJ:Naentel.

to the oontrar;y, that they -.rould

Suffice
be

J.a an iutanee, let mo recall the widespread bootili ty deaon-

8trat&d just o ye r ago by the aoat politicd.q-conacious elements in

China - the etudent.a - agaiiUit the continued presence ot American troops
iD Chiz..

ADd those troops were there with the peaceful intent or att.-pt-

-lJ-

ine to mnintain the Nationalist-Communist truoe. What would be the reaction if they were in ChiDa for tbe express purpose of aae1otinc one
section of the Chinese people against another?

Thoee who advocate a return

of American forces to Chinese soil in large nWilberl - and a program of
•positive octionw would ultimately involve precisely that - show an aO,smal
or srrogent indifference to one or tbe moat powerful forces in Chinese
lite tod&y - na tionaliea.

!hey would take on for America the same heritage

of hatred that the Uussiana are no

bWJT constructing for the!lselves in

.Dairen Md Port Arthur.
FiM.lly, let me point out the tt-.llacy of
taking poaitiTe stope

siailar action in

ass~aing

that siJlce we are

to aid Greece and Western Europe, we aust take

C~1 lnn.

The p(lttern of our Chinese policy is concerned

with the ea~bliahment ot a "strong, unit,d and deJDOcratio China• .

I

aaeume that there 18 general agreement .with this ooncept non& Americana,
although there mey be legitimate
iai.ng it.

dioegree~ent

over the technique for real-

ObTiowsly, auob a. pattern cannot preTO.U if China is dominated

by an outside power.

I think

it legitimate to eeaurae that our Government it

capable of aaking this simple deduction and therefore MT be counted upon

to appl:T .:teasures necessary to support China's sovereignty against any outside power..

But the Unit.ed Statea, in selecting the methods for imploent-

ing ite polioy in ChiD&, muat weigh all the factors in the world situation
against the resources it has aYnilable.

It •ust meeh r..cti'rlty in China

ri.th that in the Par East, in !urope, and eTen in Latin Amerlea.

In puriiUit

of our objective in Aein we •ust not pera1t our•elTea to be hastened into

a.ny action Which would result in a partial tulfill•ent ot our objective

elsewhere or eTen in China itself.

